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The cause of the ―housing bubble‖ associated with the sharp rise and then drop in home prices over the 
period 1998-2008 has been the focus of significant policy and research attention.  The dramatic 
increase in subprime lending during this period has been broadly blamed for these market dynamics.  
In this paper we empirically investigate the validity of this hypothesis vs. several other alternative 
explanations. A model of house price dynamics over the period 1998-2006 is specified and estimated 
using a cross-sectional time-series data base across 20 metropolitan areas over the period 1998-2006.  
Results suggest that prior to early 2004, economic fundamentals provide the primary explanation for 
house price dynamics. Subprime credit activity does not seem to have had much impact on subsequent 
house price returns at any time during the observation period, although there is strong evidence of a 
price-boosting effect by investor loans. However,  we do find strong evidence that a credit regime shift 
took place in late 2003, as the GSE‘s were displaced in the market by private issuers of new mortgage 
products. Market fundamentals became insignificant in affecting house price returns, and the price-
momentum conditions characteristic of a ―bubble‖ were created. Thus, rather than causing the run-up 
in house prices, the subprime market may well have been a joint product, along with house price 
increases, (i.e., the ―tail‖) of the changing institutional, political, and regulatory environment 
characteristic of the period after late 2003 (the ―dog‖). 
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 Recent turmoil in the mortgage market -- in particular a contraction in liquidity beginning in 
August 2007, significant increases in the rates of defaults and foreclosures, the failure of a number of 
mortgage firms, and large losses incurred by financial institutions and investors in mortgage and 
mortgage-related assets
1
 -- has attracted considerable attention from the media, policymakers, and 
analysts.  It is also now widely recognized that prices in the housing market, after a number of years of 
very rapid growth, have been declining at an increasingly rapid rate since sometime in early 2006.  As 
of January 2008, based on the S&P/Case-Shiller repeat sales index (CS Index), house prices nationally 
had fallen 12.5% year-over-year, with declines over 20% in some metropolitan areas. Figures 1 and 2 
depict the CS Index in levels and as quarterly returns over the period 1998-2007 in the aggregate and 
by three price-level tiers. 
 The widespread availability of subprime loan products during this period, while arguably 
increasing consumption levels and homeownership rates, has been broadly blamed for this ―bubble‖.  
The share of subprime mortgage products peaked at 23.5% of all mortgages originated during 2006, 
roughly coincident with the peak in the housing market (Inside Mortgage Finance [2007]).   
In this paper we empirically investigate the claim that increased credit availability in the 
subprime sector drove the housing boom against five alternative explanations for the current dynamic 
that have been, or could be, offered: (1) economic fundamentals (e.g., employment, income, population 
increases) were the primary drivers of price changes; (2) the problem was not subprime lending per se, 
but the Fed‘s dramatic reductions, then increases in interest rates during the early- mid-2000‘s; (3) the 
housing ―boom‖ was concentrated in those markets with significant supply-side restrictions, which 
tend to be more price-volatile; (4) the problem was not in the excess supply of credit in aggregate, or 
the increase in subprime per se, but rather in the increased or reduced presence of certain other 
mortgage products; and (5) fundamental changes in the legal/ political/ regulatory environment 
resulted in strong incentives for a surge in lending and securitization by private issuers under looser 
                                               
1  Large lenders reporting large losses include Countrywide, Citigroup, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. High profile 
bankruptcies included New Century and American Home Mortgage. 
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underwriting standards which were not sustainable.
2
 To preview our results: We confirm the 
dominance of macroeconomic fundamentals prior to late 2003, find moderate support for the influence 
of supply constraints (especially in high-end markets), but find virtually no support for the proposition 
that subprime lending per se had much to do with subsequent price rises (although investor loans and 
to a degree alt-A loans clearly did). The most surprising and important result, however, was the great 
impact that the displacement of the GSE‘s by private ABS issuers in late 2003 to the end of 2006 had 
in disconnecting market prices from their fundamentals, boosting loan and unit-production volumes, 
and accelerating house price returns.  
     
Literature Review 
In the interest of brevity, we will not provide an extensive literature review here, preferring to 
focus on a few key papers.  With respect to the measurement of house price movements, there has been 
substantial effort expended over the years in the creation and evaluation of alternative house price 
indices. Most such indices are based upon median sales prices or hedonic price estimates (e.g., FHA, 
NAR, DataQuick). Case and Shiller (CS) (1987, 1989) first apply the repeat-sales estimation technique, 
now generally regarded as the best available method for assessing house price movements over time 
because it is the only technique that is able econometrically to come close to eliminating the potential 
biases associated with uncontrolled-for variations in neighborhood or structural amenities across units.
3
 
We apply the CS approach in this study. 
                                               
2  Note that this does not exhaust all possible alternative explanations for this dynamic. Others offered include the 
arguments that the problem with prices was primarily in the supply of new housing, not with the availability and cost of 
mortgage credit, and that the problem was primarily one of fraud on the part of aggressive mortgage brokers or borrowers. 
  
3 Case and Shiller acknowledge that their index built upon earlier work by Bailey, Muth, and Nourse (1963) who first 
introduced the repeat-sales estimation methodology to the housing market. CS include all recorded sales representing a 
transfer of property ownership. They exclude refinancings and REO sales by lenders on defaulted loans and take into 
account the effects of interim property improvements on observed prices. Their primary results are available for 20 large 
metropolitan regions, as well as larger regional aggregations and 3 price tiers.The S&P/Case Shiller Indices are currently 
calculated by Fiserv, Inc., which also offers indices covering a number of zip codes (about 15% of the total) and metro 
areas using the Case-Shiller methodology.  Since November 2006, a futures product based upon the Case-Shiller Index has 
been traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (see http://www.cme.com/trading/prd/re/housing.html ). 
It should be noted that CS has been subject to criticism on the basis of potential biases originating with the fact that they 
include only sales of properties that have sold at least once, which could represent a biased sample. Methodologies intended 
to correct these shortcomings have been proposed, but none are broadly available and updated in a consistent format for 
many metro areas over a substantial time period.  
 4 
With respect to the literature on housing bubbles, there has been much recent activity owing to 
recent increases in the volatility of price cycles in the housing market. CS (2003) argue that the term 
"bubble" refers to a situation in which widespread expectations of future price increases cause prices to 
be temporarily elevated.  In turn, the expectation of large price increases may have a strong impact on 
demand if households believe that home prices are very unlikely to fall, and certainly not likely to fall 
for long, so that there is little risk associated with a home purchase.  They note, too, that the mere 
presence of rapid price increases is not in itself conclusive evidence of a bubble, since economic 
fundamentals may explain much of the observed increase. They find that that income growth alone 
explains the pattern of recent home price increases in most states and falling interest rates explain 
much of the recent run-up nationally.  Likewise, McCarthy and Peach (2004) argue that the recent 
upturn in homes prices is largely attributable to strong market fundamentals, in particular, the growth 
of income and the decline in interest rates.   
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) also focus on the ability of economic fundamentals to 
explain recent house price patterns, constructing measures of the annual cost of single-family housing 
for 46 metropolitan areas in the United States over the period 1995-2004 and comparing those costs to 
the cost of renting.  They argue that metrics such as the growth rate of house prices, the price-to-rent 
ratio, and the price-to-income ratio fail to account both for the time series pattern of real long-term 
interest rates and predictable differences in the long-run growth rates of house prices across local 
markets. They find that from the trough of 1995 to 2004, the cost of owning rose somewhat relative to 
the cost of renting, but not, in most cities, to levels implying that houses were overvalued.   
Pavlov and Wachter, in a series of papers (2004, 2006a, 2006b), develop and test models that 
examine the implications of aggressive non-recourse asset-based lending that under-price default risk. 
They demonstrate expectations of greater asset price volatility and deeper asset price ―crashes‖ 
following negative demand shocks. The causes are relaxed income constraints (on the up side) freeing 
up latent demand for home ownership and (on the down side) the decline in the availability of 
aggressive lending activities following the demand shock. Empirical tests make use of international 
                                                                                                                                                                
The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) also produces its own repeat-sales index on a quarterly basis 
for 363 MSA‘s, 11 of which are subdivided into a total of 29 Metropolitan Divisions. (Technical details are available in 
Calhoun (1996)).  The OFHEO index differs from Case-Shiller in that some data points used for index estimation are based 
on mortgage loan refinancing transactions in which an appraisal, rather than an arm‘s length sale, establishes property 
value, although recently OFHEO has made available a sale-only index.  A second difference is that the OFHEO index is 
constructed based on properties financed solely by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac loans which, though a large segment of the 
market, may not be representative of the entire market, especially in high-cost areas such as California. 
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data and data from Los Angeles to provide evidence of under-pricing of default risk on the upside, 
coupled with over-valuation of assets, along with more extreme declines afterward. 
Another strand of the literature focuses on supply constraints.  Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 
(2005) focus on regulatory constraints affecting the elasticity of housing supply.  They argue that a 
declining supply elasticity resulting from increased local development regulations in certain cities has 
caused prices to rise excessively in recent years.  These arguments are consistent with Malpezzi (1996, 
1999) and Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001), that cross-sectional variation in regulatory constraints 
helps explain variation in house price dynamics through its effect on supply elasticity.     
The above papers focus on factors unique to U.S. economic market conditions as the cause of 
the bubble.  Shiller (2007), however, notes that the recent run-up in house prices has occurred, not just 
in the U.S., but also in Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Russia, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom.  The coincidence of housing booms across countries would seem to cast 
doubt on the argument that purely local phenomena, such as supply constraints, could be responsible 
for house price growth patterns.
4
  Moreover, Shiller argues, the boom in the U.S. may be best 
understood as a series of regional booms, starting at different times.  Shiller characterizes the boom in 
home prices as a classic speculative bubble, driven by extravagant expectations for future price 
increases, and argues that survey research measuring consumer expectations confirms this description. 
More recently, Mian and Sufi (2008) use data from approximately 3,000 zip codes to examine 
the effect of freeing latent demand through an increase in the supply of mortgage credit driven by 
securitization.  They measure house price movements using zip-code level Case-Shiller indices and 
find a positive effect of high latent demand on house price growth during 2001-2005, after controlling 
for income and employment growth, and other fundamentals.  They measure latent demand by the 
percentage of home purchase loan applications denied in 1996.  While Mian and Sufi argue that an 
increase in the supply of mortgage credit had a discernable positive effect on subsequent house price 
growth rates, their estimate of its magnitude is relatively small: about 10% of the aggregate house price 
appreciation during 2001-2005 is due to a that supply shift (Mian and Sufi, page 32). Moreover, their 
measure of increase in the supply of mortgage credit is represented by the increase in the volume of all 
                                               
4  We note that the same argument could be made cross-sectionally across MSAs within the U.S., where there exist widely 
varying price trends and development regulations of widely varying degrees of restrictiveness. 
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loans originated, not just subprime loans. This increase is found to be highly correlated with the 
intensity of non-agency securitization.
5
 
In the paper arguably most closely related to ours, Wheaton and Nechayev (2007) (henceforth 
W-N) investigate whether the growth in housing prices between 1998 and 2005 can explained by 
increases in demand fundamentals such as population, income growth and the decline in interest rates.  
W-N estimate time series models for multiple markets using data from 1975 to 1998 and use those 
models to predict house price growth occurring during 1998-2005, finding that in all markets actual 
house price growth outstripped that which would be predicted by economic fundamentals by a 
considerable margin.   They use an AR(1) model of log changes in house prices as measured by the 
OFHEO repeat sales indices for 59 MSA markets, controlling for total employment, total personal 
income divided by employments, and the 30-year fixed mortgage rate.  W-N hypothesize that house 
price growth in excess of that implied by economic fundamentals is related to the emergence of risk-
priced subprime mortgage lending and the unusual growth in the demand for second homes and/or 
investment properties over the time period studied.  To test these hypotheses they examine cross-
sectional forecast errors produced by using the economic fundamentals model to predict house price 
changes.   Results establish a statistical association between measures of credit availability and the 
volume of second home purchases and the cross-sectional forecast error in house price changes, but W-
N caution that inferring causality from this relationship is difficult. Later, we will compare the 
assumptions and results from our current effort with those of W-N.  
Mortgage market trends and the changing mix of credit instruments being made available and 
demanded by borrowers have also received considerable attention.  Using Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) data , Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007) document the rapid growth of non-prime 
lending, the increased percentage of lending on properties that are not owner-occupied, and the 
increased use of simultaneous-close second liens (also called ―piggybacks‖).  The GAO has reported to 
Congress on the growth of non-traditional mortgage products (GAO [2006]), and regulatory bodies 
have set forth guidance on risks and best practices for financial institutions engaged in such lending 
                                               
5  It should be noted that Mian and Sufi‘s working paper is still in draft form and has been subject to a number of criticisms, 
including possible omitted variable bias, sample selection bias, the reduced form nature of their model, constraints imposed 





  LaCour-Little and Yang (2007) trace the history of recent mortgage contract 
innovations such as interest-only and pay-option ARMs showing that such products are rationally 
preferred by households with lower risk aversion and in markets with greater expected house price 
appreciation.  Gramlich (2007) details the rise of subprime lending, its role in increasing home 






Methodology and Model Specification 
We are interested in a simple model for home prices that explicitly allows for changes in loan 
type intensities to be a leading indicator of future home prices.  Starting with a structural model with 
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6  Though such regulatory guidance was absent earlier, a situation that has been the subject of recent debate between Alan 
Greenspan, who has been accused of primary blame for the situation, and his critics (see Greenspan, Financial Times, April 




we impose the equilibrium condition QDt = QSt , which implicitly requires market imbalances to be 
corrected over time by price adjustments. The result is a reduced form equation with prices as our main 
endogenous variable: 
 
tttttttttttt eCRKMLP   ,5,4,3,2,10       (2) 
where tn,  are reduced-form impact multipliers.
7
 
Our priors are that the predominant effect of increased density of a particular alternative loan 
type intended to increase homeownership would affect prices and returns positively (i.e., tn,  > 0), 
primarily through the demand effect.
8
 But, there could also be negative influences operating in the 
short- and longer-run on prices and returns. We recognize that lags of only a year‘s duration are 
insufficient to reveal fully the most important possible future adverse impacts of subprime loans and 
other novel mortgage arrangements on the HPI. To the extent that the most important adverse impacts 
on house prices are revealed primarily through subsequent delinquency and default experience, such 
events typically take place over a longer period of time, peaking 3 to 4 years after origination, before 
declining again. Thus, our observation period would be too short to provide much data on such an 
extended lag effect. However, we note there are other near-term effects that could also cause reduced 
house price returns. The first of these is a supply effect in which builders may supply additional units 
to the market based on lower capital costs. A second is the possibility of loose, or even fraudulent, 
underwriting, leading to higher ―early‖ defaults. Such a pattern has characterized the most recent 
cohorts of non-conforming mortgage products.
9
 Finally, ―flipping‖ of properties within a year by 
                                               
7  It is acknowledged that an estimate for user cost should be included in model specification. While we have not done so 
explicitly, virtually all the elements composing the user cost relationship are included as explanatory variables. We note 
that appreciation expectations are often the most vexing of user cost elements to proxy for. In our model these are 
considered explicitly as future house price returns. 
  
8  We have included mortgages intended for home purchase only in our data base and not ―refi‘s‖ for the purpose of 
mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) or other purposes. This is rationalized on the grounds that house prices, hence house 
price return trends, are revealed only upon sale. While MEW may indeed convey greater consumption/investment 
capability to home owners, thus in general driving the economy and probably having an indirect effect on house prices, the 
primary effect of the new private mortgage origination densities still works directly through the use of such financing for 
purchases. 
  
9  See Westley (2007), p. 23, for data supporting the increased presence of fraud in mortgage lending activity since 2003. 
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 We combine data from a number of sources to construct our pooled cross-sectional time series, 
which includes 20 metropolitan areas for 36 quarters, 1998-2006.  Our main housing market variables 
relate to lending activity and home prices.  We obtain HMDA data for home purchase loans, both to 
owner-occupants and non-owner occupants, for calendar years 1998-2006.  HMDA data, generally 
thought to be the most complete census of lending activity in the U.S., is used to construct the 
denominator in many of our measures of lending activity.  From First American Loan Performance we 
obtain counts of private-market ABS home purchase loans by type, including alt-A, BC (subprime), 
and jumbo loans, as well as non-owner occupant (investor) loans (which could be any of the above 
types).  We then define loan type densities for alt-A, BC, jumbo MBS, and non-owner occupant by 
dividing loan originations for each type by total HMDA originations.  Hence, subprime density 
represents the percentage of total loan originations accounted for by subprime mortgages.
11
  
Figure 3 summarizes our loan density distributions over our observation period by instrument. 
Note the substantial increase in both subprime and alt-A densities in 2003, followed by a clear decline 
beginning after Q1 2006. Jumbo loans, by contrast, remain relatively constant in their representation in 
the market, with even a slight decline after Q4 2004. We examine later whether this increase in 
subprime/alt-A density represents an increase in overall lending or merely a displacement of other loan 
types.  
The national average LTV for newly originated first-lien home loans over the observation 
period is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Board‘s Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) data. 
It provides evidence of considerable stability over the entire period at around 80%. Because of the lack 
of MSA-specific LTV information in the MIRS data, we made use of LTV information from Loan 
                                               
10  Although the disincentives of short-term capital gains tax treatment within a year of acquisition would tend to reduce the 
incidence of such short-term flipping behavior. 
 
11  We recognize that the Loan Performance data contains only loans that were securitized and not the universe of such 
loans made. Though the vast bulk of these loans were securitized, this potentially creates a bias in our loan density variable 
estimates. We attempted to get additional information on such loans held in portfolio from the AFSA database compiled by 
HUD, which surveys the total originations by those mortgage lenders classified as ―subprime‖, but unfortunately, such 
information was unavailable to the end of our observation period, an interval which we felt was insufficient to provide 
reliable estimates for our variables of interest. 
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Performance for our study, which provides the distribution of reported LTV‘s at origination by metro 
area for each quarter of the observation period. The average LTV across MSA‘s and over time from 
this data source was also remarkably stable, consistent with the MIRS data. Under the hypothesis that 
it is really the proportion of high-ratio loans, rather than the average LTV, that is most relevant as an 
explanatory factor for encouraging increased housing demand, we derived from LP a variable 
representing the proportion of purchase originations that had LTV‘s over 90% (Figure 4). Surprisingly, 
this variable does not increase as house prices begin rising in 2000. In fact, it drops significantly from 
around 37% of all loans made to about 12% by Q1 2006, when it again begins to rise, consistent with 
dropping house prices. 
Considered in isolation, this observation would suggest that marginal equity could not have 
been a significant contributing factor to house price and mortgage default dynamics over the study 
period. However, we must remember that the study period also saw significantly increased use of 
―piggy-back‖ second liens and ―80-10-10‖ financing to substitute for PMI or simply withdraw equity.
12
 
Thus, we obtained from Loan Performance also a measure of Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio (CLTV) 
for all MSA‘s over the observation period (Figure 5)
13
. By this measure, equity erosion at origination is 
clearly seen to have occurred over the study period, with average CLTV‘s increasing from 77% in 
1998 to 88% by 2006. 
For our final loan-related variable, from the Federal Housing Finance Board, we use the MIRS 
data to obtain the national average conventional mortgage rate each quarter.  Together, these loan-
related variables imply we have more extensive and complete measures of mortgage lending activity 
than have most previous studies, in particular that of W-N. 
For our housing price index, we use the Case-Shiller Index, as previously discussed, for all 20 
large metropolitan areas that are readily available over our observation period, both for the total market 
as well as by tiers representing the top, middle, and bottom third of prices in each market (Figures 1 
and 2). For the purpose of comparison with the results of W-N, we also obtain the OFHEO index for 
each of the quarters in our observation period. We attempt to replicate our estimation results using the 
                                               
12  See Charles A. Calhoun, ―The Hidden Risks of  Piggyback Lending,‖ commissioned by PMI, 2005. The use of 
piggyback lending rose to 42 percent of home-purchase mortgage loan dollars in the first half of 2004, compared with 20 
percent in 2001. 
 
13  The CLTV includes the outstanding balance of all liens present at the time of placement into the mortgage-backed-
security. Note that data for the Boston MSA is omitted due to gaps in reporting. 
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OFHEO index, but found that noise from OFHEO‘s appraisal-based valuations, as discussed in 
footnote 3, significantly inflated our standard errors. 
 Previous researchers have pointed out the need integrate housing supply dynamics in house 
pricing models. To address the supply side of the housing market we use the Wharton Residential Land 
Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007).  WRLURI captures a recent 
snapshot of residential housing supply-side restraints specific to over 2,600 localities and major 
metropolitan areas.  This corrects another limitation of the W-N analysis. Although the measure is 
cross-sectional only and does not vary over the observation period, we consider this a minor issue, 
given the relatively short length of the observation period and our expectation that the vast bulk of 
variation in land use regulatory stringency would exist cross sectionally.  
  For demographic and macroeconomic controls with metropolitan area granularity, we use 
population, per-capita income, and the unemployment rate.  Population and income data come from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, while unemployment data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
In addition to cross-sectional controls, we include time series of the following economic and financial 
metrics from the aggregate US economy: all US Treasury rates, major stock indices, CPI for urban 
consumers, total non-farm mortgages outstanding, and GDP.  Along with the effective mortgage rate 
(as measured by the Federal Housing Finance Board), we use the yield curve slope (10 year notes 
divided by 2 year notes) as measures of the cost of capital for home buyers.  In addition to controlling 
for inflation, the CPI also functions as a basic proxy for the cost to supply housing. 
 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all of the data elements in our analysis. All loan count 
variables represent the number of loans originated in a quarter.  The 20 metropolitan areas in our 
sample represent nearly 103 million people as of the end of 2006, over a third of the total U.S. 
population.  Table 2 shows dramatic increases in subprime lending intensity over our observation 
period, compared to relatively modest increases in income and even more modest changes in 
population.  Table 3 ranks our 20 MSAs by the percentage of loan originations that are subprime as of 
the fourth quarter of 2006.  Note that Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, which had some of the 
most dramatic increases in home prices, all rank high in subprime intensity. However, this observed 
correlation does not control for the numerous other factors potentially influencing house price changes, 
so we cannot draw definitive conclusions from this relationship. Note for example, the high correlation 
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between the intensity of subprime lending and both non-owner occupied lending and MSA per-capita 
income.  
Finally, Table 4 displays the pairwise correlations for all area-specific data in our analysis. 
Note that the highest individual correlation with quarterly house price returns is by the non-owner 
occupied loan origination density, but the level of correlation is not high (0.218). The land use 
regulatory index (WRLURI) display the second highest correlation (0.157). The economic 
fundamentals variables (population, unemployment, and per capita income) individually are not highly 
correlated with house price returns, but that does not suggest that together they might be. We note 
particularly that none of the other private ABS mortgage density variables, beyond non-owner 
occupied loans, provide any significant degree of correlation with house price returns. 
Among the explanatory variables, as expected, the highest correlations are between the private 
ABS share of new mortgages and its constituent mortgage types – subprime (0.633), alt-A (0.581), and 
non-owner occupied (0.393). Other significant correlations include the yield curve slope and the 
unemployment rate (0.600); jumbo prime, alt-A, and subprime origination densities and the per-capita 
income (0.486, 0.400, and 0.313 respectively); alt-A and subprime origination densities (0.413); and 
per-capita income with population (0.353), the land use regulatory index (0.363), and total private ABS 
shares of new mortgages (0.356).  These results are consistent with expectations: Short-term rates drop 
during periods of higher unemployment, and private ABS issues tend to be most used in higher income 
MSA‘s (which also tend to be larger), contradicting the common notion that they are primarily 
concentrated in lower-income areas. The fact that the regulatory index is also highly correlated with 
income is consistent with the findings of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) that strict land use 
controls are the product of wealthy jurisdictions.      
 
Results 
Pre-testing shows our model is accurately characterized as an AR(1) process.  Looking at 
correlograms for price levels in our main reduced form model, we find very strong serial correlation 
with a pattern characterized by first degree autocorrelation.  When we take quarterly changes in home 
prices, autocorrelation is still quite persistent.  Finally, when we take quarterly returns in home prices, 
we find lower but non-negligible indications of autocorrelation (and a very mild degree of second 
order autocorrelation).    Table 5 shows the correlograms and initial Durbin-Watson statistics of our 
main specification for price levels, changes and returns.  These initial tests suggest that the housing 
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market exhibits return momentum, not just price momentum, but that this momentum mostly occurs 
within a year. 
We use an iterative EGLS approach to address autocorrelation in housing price index returns as 
well as possible simultaneous trends between prices and independent variables during our sample 
period.  The Prais-Winsten estimates of   in the AR(1) error structure confirm the presence of 
autocorrelation in returns found in the pre-testing (Table 5).  While the momentum in returns indicates 
that including lagged returns as an explanatory variable would help predict future returns, including a 
lagged endogenous variable would make our Prais-Winsten estimates of   in the AR(1) error structure 
inconsistent.  One possible solution would be to use lags of the macroeconomic variables to create an 
instrumental variable for lagged prices.  We already control for macroeconomic variables 
contemporaneously and we want to be able to pick up any predictive power the proportions of loan 
type, especially subprime intensities, may have—whether it comes from interaction with 
macroeconomic phenomena or has a direct relationship with home prices. 
 Since we are interested in testing if subprime lending intensity has predictive power of any 
economic significance, we focus on the sign and magnitude of the impact multipliers in the reduced-
form results to measure economic significance.  Because of heterogeneity in local demographics and 
economics, it is possible that impact multipliers will vary across cities.  Since the urban economic 
literature agrees on the directional relationship between home prices and macroeconomic variables 
such as unemployment, population, and income, we pool our data across cities to measure the reduced-
form model on the national level.  We assume that any variance between cities not captured by 
population, income, unemployment, or residential land use regulation will not cause variation in the 
direction prices move with respect to various loan type densities. 
We estimated four separate sets of specifications for our single-equation reduced-form model 
described above. In order to properly handle the presence of an AR(1) error structure, we used the 
Prais-Winsten method to estimate ρ, then undertook OLS on the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. We 
clustered by MSA and used heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics. Note that all R
2
 estimates need to be 
untransformed from the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to get absolute measures of goodness of fit.  
But they can be used, as is, for comparing models. 
 
Model 1: Our base model 
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 Model 1 is our base model, used to test the fundamental relationship between subprime lending 
and house prices. Controlling for contemporaneous macro factors, and including MSA fixed effects, 
we tested the effect of the past mix of types of mortgage originations on current home prices. Four 
variations of Model 1 were estimated. Model 1a used quarterly returns in the Case-Shiller house price 
index (HPI) as the dependent variable: 
 
 Case-Shiller HPI returns = f(lagged loan-type intensity [Percentage by count of jumbo vs. alt-A 
vs. subprime vs. non-owner occupied], mortgage market conditions [CLTV at origination, 
aggregate mortgage balance, average mortgage rate], macro controls [Real GDP, aggregate 
personal savings, S&P500 index, slope of yield curve (10 yr./2 yr.), MSA population, MSA 
unemployment rate, MSA income, urban CPI], and supply constraint [MSA Wharton land use 
regulatory index])        (3) 
 
 Model 1b employed the same explanatory variables but used the quarterly change in the Case-
Shiller index as the dependent variable. Model 1c used the level of the Case-Shiller index as the 
dependent variable, and Model 1d used the OFHEO index quarterly returns as the dependent variable. 
In comparing Models 1a – 1d, we found that Model 1a, which used HPI returns as the dependent 
variable, generally did the best job of correcting for serial correlation (lowest ρ value), hence having 





Model 1d, which used the OFHEO index, had the worst fit, likely due to the noise in the data from 
appraised value transactions under refinancing. We thus confine our discussion to the results from 
Model 1a, found in Table 6.
15
 To examine the possibility that the impact of subprime loan activity 
could be concentrated differentially at the low end of the market, we ran model 1a both for the 
aggregate CS index and the CS index stratified into price terciles.  
First, with respect to the impact of the loan-type mix, we found that the relative intensity of 
jumbo prime activity had a significant cyclic relationship with future home prices.  In the short run (6 
months or less) more jumbos were associated with lower index returns.  But a year out, an increase in 
the jumbo proportion of loans increased returns. The economic magnitude of this effect was moderate: 
A 1% increase in proportion of jumbos correlated with a -0.17% quarterly return in the aggregate HPI 
                                               
14  W-N also found superiority in the model specification using price index returns. 
 
15  Results for the other models are available from the authors. 
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after six months, but a +0.24% increase after a year. This cyclic effect appears to be more extreme in 
the higher-price ranges. On the other hand, the percent of loans that were alt-A had a significant 
positive contemporary relationship with home prices (+0.12%), offset by a negative marginally-
significant relationship with home prices a year later (-0.08%). This effect was strongest in the mid-
price tier. These results suggest that alt-A and jumbos have opposite temporal cycles with respect to 
their relationship between quarterly returns and home prices, though similar in magnitude. 
The non-owner occupied mortgage market was found similar in pattern to the alt-A market, 
though significantly greater in magnitude. The percent of loans that were non-owner occupied had a 
significant positive relationship with home prices over 0-6 months (peaking at +0.33% after 3 months 
in the aggregate model).  But over 9-12 months this relationship reversed and there was a significant 
negative effect of a similar magnitude (-0.26% after 12 months). These effects were of comparable 
magnitude across all price tiers. Thus, while contemporaneously and in the short run the non--owner 
occupied home buyers bid up home prices, they had a significant negative effect over the longer run 
that tended to offset it. The extent to which this pattern may have had anything to do with any intent to 
―flip‖ properties after a year is unclear. 
Significantly, we found in Model 1a (and virtually always throughout our analysis) the percent 
of originated loans that were subprime had virtually no statistical significance on future home prices 
over any interval or price tier, and even the point estimates were small in economic terms. The only 
partial exception is a small (+0.04 to +0.08%) and barely significant positive contemporaneous effect 
that persists across price tiers (but is insignificant in the aggregate). This finding runs contrary to the 
hypothesis that subprime lending per se was largely responsible for the run-up in the HPI ending in 
2006. Since non-owner occupant loans could be either subprime, jumbo, or alt-A, subprime could be 
still operating interactively through the investor loans, but there is little significant evidence of a direct 
effect, even in the lowest price tier. The CLTV seemed to be significantly associated with house price 
changes only in the lowest price tier, and that relationship was negative. A 1% increase in the CLTV 
was associated with a 0.16% decline in contemporaneous quarterly HPI returns in the lowest tercile of 
the market. This is contrary to expectations that more lenient loan terms would drive house prices 
higher through demand effects unless one believes increased credit availability could represent an 
―oversupply‖ of credit, shifting the housing supply curve outward and downward and reducing prices. 
Although our results show no evidence of subprime intensity having an effect on future housing 
returns, a potential endogeneity between subprime intensity and housing returns should be noted.  Our 
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main question has to do with subprime‘s effect on home prices, but a separate question is, ―how do 
housing returns effect subprime intensity?‖  Given the high levels of autocorrelation in housing returns 
it is possible that lenders relax (tighten) their lending standards when housing returns are positive 
(negative) since the borrower probably can (cannot) sell or refinance if mortgage payments become 
burdensome.  In this case, subprime intensity could appear to have an effect on future home prices 
when it is merely the byproduct of past housing returns.  We find that the level of subprime intensity is 
indeed positively related to past housing returns (Table 7), although the degree of serial correlation in 
subprime intensity inflates the statistical significance.  This endogeneity provides empirical support to 
our assertion that subprime did not itself contribute to the run-up in housing prices in the mid 2000‘s, 
and strengthens our argument that subprime intensity should not be considered a primary causal factor 
in housing returns. 
With respect to our mortgage market and macro economic variables, we found that the 
aggregate level of mortgage lending, population growth, and the unemployment rate were the main 
variables driving home prices. These operated primarily in the mid-tier and high-tier markets. 
Surprisingly, the level of mortgage interest rates was not found to have a significant relationship with 
home prices.  Over our sample period the Fed raised, lowed and raised again the Fed Funds rate but 
house prices had a single increasing trend until 2006Q3. The negative significant coefficient on 
aggregate home mortgage debt outstanding, especially at the high end of the market, is interesting and 
unexpected, although it is consistent with the results for CLTV above, in which increased credit 
availability represents an ―oversupply‖ of credit, driving down prices.
16
 
Finally, we observe that the supply constraint index (WRLURI) is correctly positively signed 
and significant.  This significance is entirely at the high end of the market, however. Restrictive land 
                                               
16  We note that the pairwise correlation with each of CLTV with each of the loan type origination intensities is as follows: 
subprime 0.5011, jumbo prime -0.3174, alt-A 0.3195, and non-owner occupied 0.4894. The high correlations with 
subprime and non-owner occupied would be expected to lower the significance of their coefficients. The non-owner 
occupied coefficients are still highly significant in spite of this, reinforcing the strength of this loan type in influencing 
house price returns. Model 1a was run with both LTV and CLTV as explanatory variables. In both cases, the coefficients 
for subprime remained largely insignificant, suggesting the strength of the negative CLTV effect on house price returns 
relative to the subprime intensity effect. 
 
We examined the extent to which CLTV increases were due to higher first-, or increased use of ―piggyback‖ and other 
second-lien programs. LTV remained relatively constant over the observation period, both for the GSE‘s and the broader 
market. The inability of the GSE‘s and other first-lien holders to identify the existence of second liens in many cases has 
been identified as an issue of significant policy concern.  
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use regulatory policy does not appear to drive low- or middle-tier house prices upward, a result that has 




Model 2: GSE-to-private ABS regime shift 
As shown Figure 6, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae exhibited two different regimes of behavior 
during our observation period.
18
 Before 2004, they were active issuers and purchasers of conventional 
conforming mortgages and MBS securities (regime I), typically responsible for over 50% of net new 
lending each quarter. However, at this time and until 2006, their activity level dropped considerably 
(regime II), to close to zero by 2006Q4. At the same time, the net increment to mortgage debt 
outstanding reached record highs in the period 2004 through the first two quarters of 2006, with 
evidence of at least partial replacement of the GSE‘s during this period by private label issuers. From 
2002Q4 to 2005Q1, the private ABS issuers‘ share of market activity rose from less than 10% to over 
50%. However, after early 2007, as house prices stagnated, defaults increased, and problems of 
illiquidity in the private ABS market set in, regime III was initiated -- the GSE‘s became the only 
game in town as new private ABS issues disappeared and total net new mortgage origination volume 
plummeted. 
The reasons for the GSE‘s absence from the market during this period are many and complex. 
First is the fact that they were experiencing considerable political problems in Washington. Accounting 
irregularities resulted in pressure that ultimately led to the resignation of their senior officers, Leland 
Brendsel of Freddie Mac in June 2003 and Franklin Raines of Fannie Mae in December 2004. As a 
result of the revision in their books, both were required to provide a substantial capital infusion and 
maintain higher capital levels. Ongoing accusations of lack of safety and soundness, caused by alleged 
lack of proper hedging mechanisms and their being ―too big,‖ resulted -- in their weakened political 
                                               
17  It should be noted that the Wharton Land Use Regulatory Index varied by MSA only and was considered constant over 
time and across house-price tiers. This could have obscured possible effects temporally and across individual MSA 
submarkets. 
 
18  We formally evaluated whether the regime shift in our observation period is significant and the optimal break point by 
constructing a Chow test that tested the linear restriction that the regression coefficients are the same as in our base model 
1a. Our loan intensity coefficients and macroeconomic/ mortgage market coefficients are tested separately. 
Macroeconomic/ mortgage market coefficients demonstrate the largest statistical significance at a 2003Q3 break point, 
while loan intensity coefficients do so slightly earlier, at 2003Q2. Results are available from the authors. 
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state -- in pledges to reduce the growth of their retained portfolios.
19
 In addition, their maximum 
lending limit for single-family loans became highly constraining, especially in expensive high-growth 
states such as California, in the face of continuing increases in house prices nationwide, resulting in 
their being able to purchase increasingly fewer loans.
20
 An additional constraint was a requirement by 
OFHEO in November, 2004, to increase their participation in affordable housing initiatives, including 
the purchase of subprime and other MBS products as well as investments in Section 42 LIHTC 
multifamily developments.
21
 Increases in demand for private-label subprime pools at this time would 
be expected to further exacerbate ―bubble‖ conditions through demand effects. 
However, the explanation for GSE withdrawal from a dominant mortgage origination position 
in early 2004 is more complex than simply political and regulatory pressures. The GSE‘s actually 
loosened their underwriting standards to a degree during this period, through the reduction of 
documentation requirements and other means, and attempted to compete aggressively with the private-
label ABS issuers, but were unsuccessful because credit spreads became so tight.
22
 Recently, Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke and former Chairman Alan Greenspan have cited the rapid spread of 
weakened underwriting standards among the mortgage originators supporting the private ABS issuance 
market starting in 2005 (see Greenspan [2008]). Indirectly, our data suggests this started as early as 
                                               
19  Their retained loan portfolio was a source of ongoing policy controversy and was proposed to be capped in the 
Administration‘s FY2004 budget. In May 2006, Fannie Mae agreed to an OFHEO requirement that it restrict growth of its 
portfolio to the level of December 31, 2005 (OFHEO, 2006). In July 2006, Freddie Mac agreed not to increase its retained 
portfolio beyond its level of June 30, 2006 (Syron, 2006). Retained portfolio restrictions for the GSE‘s were enacted into 
law in 2008. 
 
20  The limit was raised from $300,700 to $322,700 as of January 1, 2003, then in increments up to only $333,700 in 2004, 
$359,650 in 2005, and $417,000 in 2006, where it remained until the recent Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 
permitting an increase to $625,500 (Mortgage Banking Magazine, various issues). 
 
21  Leonnig (2008). We note that many of these pressures brought to bear on the GSEs can be traced back to a long-standing 
opposition to the further development and dominance of the GSEs by the Republican-dominated Congress and 
Administration, who advocated on behalf of banks and other private financial institutions as their being ably suited to take 
on Freddie and Fannie‘s role without the ―implicit government subsidy‖ created by their implicit Federal government 
guarantee on their debt. See Thomas (2003) for a concise statement of the Republican issues with respect to the continued 
dominance of the GSE‘s. See also Jaffee and Quigley (2007), Hamilton (2008), Stevenson (2000), Tierney (2003), McLean 
(2005), and Muolo and Padilla (2008) for less partisan discussions of the recent challenges to the dominance of the GSE‘s.  
 
22  Possible explanations for their self-imposed limits on how far they could go to maintain market share vary, but include 
their mandated ―safety and soundness‖ standards, whether imposed internally or externally through OFHEO, Congress, and 
the Administration. This constraint, in turn, could be explained either by politics or by proper risk management safeguards 
imposed in earlier times by responsible policymakers and regulators. 
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late 2003. Evidence, too, grew of fraud on the part of certain mortgage brokers, lenders, appraisers, and 
borrowers in the way of falsified applications and other documentation.
23
 
The significant withdrawal of the GSEs from the conventional conforming market is shown in 
Figure 6 to have led to a significant substitution effect, in which the private-issue ABS and RMBS 
market supplanted that of the conventional conforming RMBS market for new originations during this 
period.
24
 This is a little-recognized fact: The residential mortgage sector experienced a double shock 
during our observation period. Overall lending volume to the sector increased to record levels, peaking 
at a net quarterly additions of around $301 billion by 2006 Q2, while at the same time the percent of 
net additions to outstanding mortgage balances represented by private ABS issuers rose from an 
average of 13% of the market in the period 1998 to 2003 to an average of 47% in 2004 and 2005.
25
 At 
the same time, the GSE share dropped from an average of 54% of the market in the 1998-2003 period 
to under 7% in2004-05.
26
 A natural question of concern is the extent to which such a regime change 
had on the housing market, and specifically house prices.  
To address this question, we ran our model stratified for the two regime periods 1998Q1 to 
2003Q3 and 2003Q4 to 2006Q4. Our results are shown in Models 2a and 2b (Table 8), which represent 
Model 1a but run only over the segmented observation periods. We note first and most importantly, 
that our goodness of fit measures for both models improved when we split our data into the two 
regimes, especially for the second regime period, suggesting that the change in GSE activity did have a 
significant impact on house prices. 
In regime I, before the GSE pullback, we see that most of the macroeconomic fundamentals, 
including the unemployment rate and income variables, are significant and of the correct sign. This 
model has the lowest estimated value for ρ of all the models (demonstrating the least autocorrelation), 
possibly an indication of a market that was not experiencing rising demand based on past increases in 
                                               
23  See Luhby, (2008). 
 
24  In fact, the effect was even stronger than a ―substitution‖ effect. The total volume of  net new home mortgage lending 
peaked at $1.106 trillion in 2005, up from $798.9 billion in 2003, before dropping back to $706.6 billion by 2007 (Figure 6). 
 
25  The ABS presence in the market actually dropped to a negative 4% in 2000 Q1, reflecting the fallout from the liquidity 
crisis precipitated originally by the Russian bond default. In 2005 Q1 it rose to a record 57% of the market. 
 
26  The GSE‘s share dropped to as low as negative 2% of the market in 2003 Q4, during the height of the fallout from their 
accounting irregularity investigations. We note that when the bubble burst, with originations dropping after 2006 Q2, the 
GSEs‘ share of net new lending began rising rapidly, to reach 150% of quarterly flows by 2007 Q4. The private ABS issuer 
share, on the other hand, did not break until 2007 Q2, but dropped rapidly, from almost 50% of net new additions in 2007 
Q1 to -60% in 2007 Q4 (in other words, rapid de-leveraging was going on while positions were being liquidated). 
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prices (i.e., not a ―bubble‖ market). In regime II, however, the macroeconomic fundamentals (income 
and unemployment) lost their significance. Other factors were driving HPI returns. This model had the 
highest estimated value of ρ, suggesting that regime II exhibited the highest degree of momentum in 
housing returns, a ―bubble‖ characteristic.
27
 
During regime I, the jumbo MBS, alt-A, non-owner occupied, and subprime loan percentages 
have basically the same pattern of results as in model 1a, though generally at somewhat lower 
significance levels. Subprime loans retain their positive marginally-significant contemporaneous effect 
on prices, though the coefficient is somewhat higher than in the 3-tier models (+0.17% vs. +0.04 to 
+0.08%). However, lagged coefficients, though insignificant, tended to offset this effect in the 
aggregate during regime I. 
The impact of the loan percentage variables appears to diminish considerably during regime II, 
with the exception of the non-owner occupied loan density, which increases the magnitude and 
significance of its first-positive, then-negative effect on returns. The only other loan type whose 
origination density seems to show significant impact on returns is a contemporaneous positive effect 
(+0.24%) by alt-A mortgages. We note that the prior indication of modest significance of the 
origination density of subprime lending on house price returns during regime I disappears entirely 
during regime II.       
We note finally one other variable that displayed a highly significant impact during regime II 
but not during regime I, when the GSE‘s still dominated the market. The steepness of the yield curve 
(ratio of 10-year to 2-year Treasury yields to maturity) displays a coefficient of -3.99, implying the 
flattening of the yield curve after the Fed began raising rates in 2004 had a strong accelerating effect 
on house prices. This would normally be expected to dampen demand by borrowers seeking low-rate 
ARM loans, but instead we saw a substantial increase in loan volume after the Fed‘s actions to raise 
rates. This could be interpreted as a ―rush to the exit‖ by borrowers seeking to beat future increases, 
but perhaps a more defensible explanation is on the supply side: ABS lenders had a great hunger for 
yield, which drove both the softening of underwriting standards and the creation of new ―teaser rate‖ 
ARM‘s or other mortgage products (such as ―2-28‘s‖) that could provide greater initial access to credit 
to previously marginal borrowers, but higher expected yields going forward. This effect more than 
                                               
27  We note that, while real GDP was found to positively effect house prices, as expected, especially in the high end of the 
market over the entire observation period, its influence was found anomalously to be negative (although small in 
magnitude) during regime II (2004-06). This result suggests again other intervening factors were at play which were 
reflective of a market in deisequilibrium.  
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offset the increased short-term rate effect, especially since the long rate remained relatively constant 
over the period, which served as the primary basis for cap rate formation in the housing market. 
 In other words, if the I-banks and hedge funds had a hunger for spread during this period of a 
flat yield curve, then their demand could have been fueling subprime and other alternative mortgage 
activity. MBS spreads general tightened over this period, indicating increased demand from the high-
finance community. Our primary conclusion to be drawn from the dominant GSE- vs. dominant 
private-ABS-regimes is that the primary driver of house price returns during the GSE-dominant years 
tended to be economic fundamentals, with some indication of short-term, largely offsetting effects 
from jumbos, subprime, and non-owner occupied investor loans. However, in the ABS-dominant years, 
with one exception, the loan-density related effects largely disappeared, as did the effects of economic 
fundamentals. Non-owner occupied loans and the hunger for yields by private ABS issuers exploiting 
the dynamics of the yield curve (while ex post found to be under-pricing risk) drove house price 
returns to new highs, which did not abate until 2006. Subprime lending activity per se was not the 
primary culprit in driving house prices higher. Rather both were the products of an economic 





Testing for Robustness 
 A number of additional model specifications were estimated as a robustness test to ascertain the 
extent to which our results as stated above may be associated with specific relationships that might 
modify our interpretations. Specifically, we tested for four separate possible hypotheses: The impacts 
of loan origination densities across instruments upon Case-Shiller House Price Returns (CS HPR‘s) are 
mediated by (1) local and temporal economic fundamentals; (2) the magnitude of subprime penetration 
at the peak of the housing bubble (in quintiles); (3) the magnitude of house price returns over the 
observation period (in quintiles) ; and (4) the interaction between the magnitude of subprime 
penetration (lowest vs. highest) and the house price tier (lowest vs. highest). These estimations are 
                                               
28  We should clarify several points with respect the emergence of the various underwriting criteria and private-issue 
mortgage designs during the 2000‘s. 2/28 loans had been a staple of subprime lenders for a number of years and their 
―teaser rates‖ were relatively high even before 2003 (Foote, et al. (2008)). However, their volume was not as high as later, 
and their problems were not apparent, given continuing appreciation in the housing market in the earlier years. Option-
ARM‘s did increase after 2003 and offered low down payments, but this increase was almost wholly in the alt-A prime 
market, allowing otherwise-qualified borrowers to qualify for mortgages in areas becoming unaffordable. Because option-
ARM‘s tended to be held in portfolio, rather than placd into securities (e.g., Golden West Savings), the Loan Performance 
data, which is based upon securitized product only, may be biased downward in terms of origination intensity.  
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intended to evaluate the extent to which the impact of lending activity density may vary across certain 
clusters of MSA‘s. We note below the significant finds from this exercise; full estimation results are 
available from the authors. 
First, we consider the interaction effects with economic fundamentals. We ask whether 
subprime lending concentration, found to be insignificant in our base model, can become important in 
certain low-growth (or high-growth) MSA‘s. Subprime insignificance persists, however, across all 
economic interaction specifications. The strong significance we found of non-owner occupied lending 
activity on house price returns for the most part disappears with consideration of the economic 
interaction terms, suggesting a consistent effect across MSA‘s of all economic conditions. Jumbo loan 
activity, however, displays both direct and interaction effects with economic fundamentals. 
With respect to interaction with the degree of subprime penetration, insignificance was again 
persistent across all quintiles, in particular the quintile representing the highest degree of subprime 
origination density. Non-owner occupied lending activity, however, did appear to become more 
economically and statistically significant in the higher quintiles of subprime lending. This again 
reinforces the robustness of our previous results – the importance of non-owner occupied lending and 
lack of importance of subprime lending per se in affecting house price returns. 
With respect to interaction with the level of ―hotness‖ (i.e., appreciation) of the MSA housing 
market, we find the density of subprime lending has no effect in the lowest three quintiles, but a 
negative effect in months 9-12 in the fourth quintile and a positive effect in the highest quintile 
(―hottest‖) markets. Further examining the 5
th
 quintile, we find that subprime‘s effect is strongest 
among the highest-end homes (third price tier). The coefficient is highly significant and of high 
economic importance: a 10% increase in subprime density leads to a 2.4 percent increase in quarterly 
return after a year (roughly double). This result is counterintuitive, as one would have expected 
subprime credit availability to have driven up lower-priced homes in less ―hot‖ markets, but it seems 
that the effect was primarily felt in the already ―hot‖ markets and at the higher end of the housing stock. 
We note parenthetically that there is some evidence supporting possible ―flipping‖ effects among those 
using non-owner occupied loans, as the initial gains created by subprime availability are entirely 
reversed out over a year. 
Finally, with respect to interaction with both house price tier (lowest vs. highest) and degree of 
subprime penetration n (lowest vs. highest), we find that subprime lending is most influential among 
the lowest-priced homes where there is the least subprime concentration. The coefficient is highly 
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significant and of high economic importance; an increase of 10% in subprime concentration increases 
house price quarterly returns by 3.1% (over double) over a year. 
Overall, we find that our previous results are relatively robust, but that subprime lending 
density can make a greater positive difference in returns at the margin among the lowest price homes if 
the level of such lending is low to begin with. Otherwise subprime lending has little direct effect on 
low-end house price returns. Non-owner occupied lending activity, however, remains important in 
driving returns, especially so in areas where subprime lending activity is already high. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications: 
 Our analysis, though closely related to that of Wheaton and Nebchayev (W-N, 2007) in purpose, 
differs from theirs in important respects. Whereas their observation period extended to only 2005, we 
were able to incorporate information through 2006, thus capturing at least he beginning of the ―bubble 
burst‖. Our analysis was also a pooled, cross-sectional analysis of MSAs; we did not run separate MSA 
analyses to evaluate the effects of the economic fundamentals variables, then a separate analysis on the 
2005 forecast errors to get at the effects of lending and other non-fundamental variables. We made use 
of the Case-Shiller House Price Index (HPI), rather than the OFHEO Index, which we found 
introduced considerable noise, likely due to OFHEO‘s inclusion of appraisal-based value estimates 
from the inclusion of refinancings. We also had available information from Loan Performance, which 
provided loan origination information over time by MSA by loan type, whereas W-N had to use 
proxies for subprime loan originations and were not able to consider such other loan types as jumbos, 
ARMs, or alt-As. Finally, we were able to include certain supply, as well as demand-side variables, 
which they did not consider, specifically a proxy for residential construction costs and a land use 
regulatory index. 
Our results confirm certain of the findings of W-N with respect to the influence of fundamental 
economic factors on house price dynamics during the run-up of the early 2000‘s. Specifically, we 
found that the size of the MSA, population growth, employment (unemployment rates in our models), 
and per capita incomes drive house prices in the expected directions, at least in the early years of our 
observation period, through 2003. In addition, we confirm their findings with respect to certain 
lending-related factors that were present during the observation period: specifically, our non-owner 
occupied loan origination intensity variable, corresponding roughly with their variable for second or 
investment home loans, was found to be significant 
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In certain other respects, however, we found evidence contrary to or unavailable in W-N‘s 
initial findings. Surprisingly, mortgage interest rates were not found to have a significant relationship 
with house prices when other factors were taken into account. The construction cost index for housing, 
proxied in this study by the CPI index, was found to have a marginally significant positive influence on 
house prices, but only during regime I (1998-2003) when economic fundamentals were most 
influential. A second supply variable, the Wharton Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI) also tended 
to drive up prices, but only in the highest tercile of the market. The composite LTV (CLTV) was 
significant only among the lowest-priced homes and during regime II (2004-2006), and in both cases 
its effect was negative (i.e., high LTV‘s, rather than driving further price increases through their 
demand effects, may have positively influenced housing supply, thus driving down prices). This result 
is contrary to W-N‘s positive LTI (loan-to-income) variable effect, used as a proxy for ―looser‖ 
lending standards on house prices. 
Some of our most interesting results derived from our availability of the Loan Performance data, 
which provided a detailed breakdown of loan originations by type. These results suggested that the 
pattern of contemporaneous and lagged effects of different loan-type originations on house prices was 
complex, and varied both by loan type and lag-length. The percent of jumbo and alt-A loans both had 
significant cyclical relationships with house price returns, though in different directions. Jumbos were 
associated with initially lower price index returns (6 months or less) but the effect turned positive and 
significant after a year. Alt-A loans behaved in an opposite fashion: contemporaneously and within a 
short period they were associated with an increase in house prices, a relationship which turned negative 
after a year. In both cases, the effects are relatively small to moderate in magnitude. 
The non-owner occupied loan market, which we already indicated coincided with W-N‘s 
finding of significance of investor loans in affecting house price returns, displayed a similar 
relationship to that of the alt-A market, with a positive relationship up to 3 months out, dropping to a 
negative relationship of comparable magnitude after 12 months. The magnitudes of the effects were 
significantly higher than those in the jumbo and alt-A markets. Importantly, and contrary to the 
conclusions of W-N, we found very little evidence of an increased concentration of subprime lending 
per se having any significant impact on house price index returns, with the exception of a small 
contemporaneous effect and during regime I (1998-2003). These results are seemingly in contrast to 
Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006a, 2006b) if we confine our consideration to the subprime sector alone. 
But considering the entire set of private ABS loans (including in particular non-owner occupied and 
 25 
alt-A loan origination densities) suggests that loan-origination density effects taken together were still 
found to be associated with higher house price returns.
29
 
The most important and heretofore unrecognized impact of lending patterns on subsequent 
house price returns was found to originate with the regime-shift which occurred in early 2004, with the 
squeezing out of the GSE‘s from the market, both because of political, regulatory, and economic 
factors. The resulting reshuffling of supply of mortgage capital in the market, resulted in both a record 
increase in total lending volume after 2003 and a substantial substitution of alternative private 
instruments for conventional conforming GSE loans. This was particularly true of the alt-A, subprime, 
and non-owner occupied investor products. We find that the dominance of economic fundamentals and 
other market characteristics in driving house price returns to be more significant in the earlier years, 
before the GSE pullback. After the pullback, not only were economic fundamentals less important, the 
measures of autocorrelation present in our model estimates suggested this period possessed the highest 
degree of momentum in house prices – a ―bubble‖ characteristic. 
The dominant policy conclusion that can be drawn from the findings of this paper is that the 
existence of subprime loan products alone may not merit primary blame for the problems currently 
being experienced in the housing and mortgage markets. Rather, political and regulatory actions and 
economic conditions -- which led to a disruption in traditional flows of credit into the market and the 
relative absence of the GSE‘s during the period 2004-06 -- permitted the spread not only of new 
private-issue instrument designs and ABS products, but also of weaker underwriting standards to flow 
in great volumes into the void.  These events may be deemed complicit, if not dominant in 
precipitating the subsequent series of adverse trends which later beset the housing and mortgage 
markets. 
                                               
29  This can be seen easily by looking at the coefficients for the contemporaneous effect of all loan densities in Table 6 for 
all HPI tiers and in the aggregate. All are positive, and although the subprime coefficient is insignificant, several loan-types, 
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Single-family home purchase transactions are classified into terciles by price of the home.  All three 
tiers are standardized to 100 at the start of 2000. SPCS20R is for all 20 Case-Shiller metro areas and 
has data back to 2000.  CSXR is for the 10 largest areas and has data back to 1987. 
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Single-family home purchase transactions are classified into terciles by price of the home.  
Source: S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Index 
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 Figure 3 
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Year,Quarter
Jumbo Prime Density Alt-A Density
Subprime Density Non-Owner Occupied Density
 
 
Counts of each loan type are divided by total count of HMDA loans resulting in the percent of total 
loans accounted for by each loan type.  Percent prime can be approximated as 1-
(Percent_MBS+Percent_AltA+Percent_BC).  Subprime lending intensity peaks mid-year 2006. 
 












































Includes Loan Performance loan origination counts for the 20 MSA‘s used to calculate the Case-Shiller 
20 Index. 
 








*Does not include Boston MSA 
 




Summary Statistics for the 20 Case-Shiller MSA Sample, 1998Q1-2006Q4 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Case-Shiller Home Price Index 134.76 44.48 76.73 280.03 
Case-Shiller quarterly return 2.03 2.23 -4.25 16.11 
Case-Shiller Low Price Tier quarterly return 2.61 2.46 -4.53 15.06 
Case-Shiller Mid Price Tier quarterly return 2.26 2.41 -3.20 18.13 
Case-Shiller High Price Tier quarterly return 2.06 2.30 -4.16 15.87 
Loan Variables     
Loan counts     
Jumbo Prime loan count 651 650 5 4,414 
Alt-A loan count 1,247 1,732 38 10,281 
Subprime loan count 2,295 2,890 5 15,928 
Non-owner occupied loan count 1,730 1,538 260 11,566 
Loan densities     
Jumbo Prime loan density 5.1% 7.9% 0.2% 69.3% 
Alt-A loan density 8.7% 12.0% 0.4% 79.3% 
Subprime loan density 13.2% 12.7% 1.0% 81.8% 
Non-owner occupied loan density 9.6% 5.5% 2.2% 30.0% 
     
Mortgages>90%LTV 25.7% 14.2% 0.2% 56.3% 
Combined LTV* 83.2 4.5 71.8 92.9 
ARM density, nationally 21.7% 8.4% 9.7% 37.7% 
Supply side restrictions     
WRLURI 0.3128 0.5464 -0.6191 1.3566 
Metropolitan specific economic fundamentals     
Unemployment rate 4.7% 1.3% 1.8% 8.7% 
Population 4,907,559 4,076,896 1,233,759 18,800,000 
Income $36,174  $5,784  $25,243  $57,430  
National macroeconomic variables     
CPI Urban (1984=100) 182.2 13.1 161.9 208.9 
Outstanding Home Mortgages ($Mill) $6,677,724  $1,990,834  $4,044,035  $10,700,000  
Real GDP ($Bill, 2000) $10,220  $723  $8,936  $11,631  
Aggregate personal savings ($Bill) 148.311 78.95198 -48.8 291.7 
S&P 500 Index $1,182.32  $156.70  $860.76  $1,475.98  
Cost of capital     
Effective Mortgage Rate, nationally 6.66% 0.75% 5.60% 8.10% 
US govt 10yr/2yr YTM 1.3765 0.5074 0.9410 2.5469 
 




Case-Shiller metro areas*: 
Percent changes in metropolitan area data from 1998Q1-2006Q4 
 
 Percent Change 




Income Population HPI 
Washington 2038% 261% 48% 15% 171% 
San Diego 1778% 104% 57% 8% 205% 
Detroit - MI 1468% 434% 27% 1% 41% 
Chicago 1409% 177% 35% 7% 87% 
Denver 1349% 164% 43% 19% 71% 
Phoenix - AZ 1333% 146% 37% 35% 156% 
Los Angeles 1318% 66% 42% 8% 235% 
Cleveland - OH 1301% 151% 31% -2% 33% 
New York 1249% 85% 41% 5% 155% 
Minneapolis - MN 1198% 302% 36% 11% 105% 
Boston 1120% 70% 49% 3% 117% 
Las Vegas 1065% 226% 34% 47% 149% 
Seattle - WA 1016% 130% 40% 11% 117% 
Charlotte - NC 987% 214% 35% 28% 39% 
Miami 851% 90% 44% 14% 208% 
Portland - OR 802% 131% 33% 16% 93% 
Tampa - FL 673% 238% 39% 17% 156% 
San Francisco 670% 40% 50% 4% 179% 
Atlanta - GA 643% 280% 24% 31% 53% 
Dallas - TX* 470% 255% 21% 18% 24% 
Mortgage type intensities are calculated as the number of loans originated of a given type divided by 
the total number of HMDA loans originated.  *Dallas: Case-Shiller HPI data began in 2000Q1, thus all 
changes for Dallas are over the period 2000Q1-2006Q4. 
 






Case-Shiller metro areas: 
Subprime loan intensity vs. income and population 
 
    
  As of 2006 4
th






Los Angeles 33% $40,144 12,958,274 
Detroit - MI 31% $38,504 4,463,822 
Miami 31% $40,689 5,483,437 
Las Vegas 26% $36,977 1,811,627 
San Diego 25% $43,911 2,943,877 
Phoenix - AZ 25% $34,660 4,119,511 
Dallas - TX 23% $40,176 6,094,429 
Washington 21% $52,462 5,309,786 
Denver 19% $45,264 2,432,236 
Tampa - FL 18% $35,814 2,723,327 
Portland - OR 18% $38,003 2,158,062 
Cleveland - OH 18% $37,894 2,108,664 
Atlanta - GA 18% $36,357 5,221,225 
Chicago 17% $42,266 9,535,340 
New York 16% $49,962 18,820,944 
Minneapolis - MN 15% $44,499 3,192,037 
Boston 15% $51,544 4,458,383 
Seattle - WA 15% $45,538 3,291,300 
Charlotte - NC 13% $38,954 1,613,787 
San Francisco 13% $57,430 4,191,035 
 
Subprime intensity is calculated as the number of subprime loans originated divided by the total 
number of HMDA loans originated. 
 









































Returns 1           
Subprime 
Origination 
Density -0.0229 1          
Alt-A 
Origination 




Density 0.2176 0.2823 0.4027 1        
Jumbo Prime 
Origination 
Density 0.0159 0.0979 0.511 0.0796 1       
Unemployment 
Rate -0.0901 0.2168 -0.0406 0.1458 -0.0667 1      
Per-capita 
Income 0.0337 0.3133 0.3995 0.1434 0.4855 0.0277 1     
Population 0.123 0.1468 0.1554 -0.1128 0.2795 0.1961 0.3526 1    
WRLURI 0.1566 0.022 0.1039 -0.0004 0.2361 -0.0112 0.363 0.1131 1   
Yield curve 
slope (10/2) 0.1129 -0.1115 -0.1587 0.0774 -0.0745 0.5996 0.0561 0.0033 0 1  
Private ABS 
Share of new 
mortgages 0.0246 0.6334 0.5809 0.3927 0.0657 0.1134 0.3562 0.0096 0 -0.1491 1 
 
Pairwise correlations are calculated across all 20 Case-Shiller metropolitan areas and across all quarters, 1998Q1-2006Q4.  Subprime 
origination intensity is calculated as the number of subprime loans originated divided by the total number of HMDA loans originated. 
Non-owner occupied origination intensity is calculated similarly.  WRLURI is a cross-sectional variable that is static through time.  
 39 
 
Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) find that higher land use regulation is associated with a higher income area.  This is confirmed in 
our Case-Shiller Metropolitan area sample.  
 
Source: Loan Performance; HMDA; Bureau of Economic Analysis; S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Index; Gyourko, Saiz, and 
Summers (2007); Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Table 5 
Momentum in Housing Price Levels, Changes, and Returns 
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Correlograms show autocorrelations over a two year period.  Only price changes show significant autocorrelation beyond 
one year.  Rho estimates are calculated with Prais-Winsten iterative algorithm.  Durbin-Watson statistics are calculated with 




Base Model 1a: Independent Variable – Quarterly Returns in the HPI, by Price Tier 
1998Q1 – 2006Q4 
 
N 584 496 496 496 
R
2 
0.534 0.4608 0.5471 0.5607 
Adjusted R 
2 
0.5060 0.4223 0.5148 0.5293 
Case-Shiller HPI returns All Tiers Low Tier Mid Tier High Tier 
     
Jumbo Prime     
  no lag 0.03768 (0.73) 0.04354 (1.07) 0.05825 (1.1) 0.06884 (0.99) 
  3 month lag -0.11661 (-3.49) -0.0097 (-0.26) -0.12191 (-3.39) -0.17426 (-4.66) 
  6 month lag -0.16692 (-2.85) -0.13395 (-2.85) -0.18952 (-3.71) -0.21256 (-2.79) 
  9 month lag 0.07352 (2.92) 0.02911 (1.07) 0.08133 (2.44) 0.07247 (3.09) 
  12 month lag 0.239 (9.94) 0.12163 (4.39) 0.2391 (8.65) 0.28233 (10.26) 
Alt-A density     
  no lag 0.12052 (2.03) 0.08869 (2.17) 0.13748 (2.28) 0.11517 (3.08) 
  3 month lag 0.02582 (0.7) 0.01531 (0.58) -0.00564 (-0.12) -0.03501 (-0.7) 
  6 month lag -0.03972 (-1.37) -0.07493 (-2.83) -0.04689 (-1.21) -0.00936 (-0.21) 
  9 month lag -0.02779 (-0.52) -0.01794 (-0.35) -0.04439 (-0.94) -0.06066 (-0.98) 
  12 month lag -0.08139 (-2.18) -0.06512 (-1.57) -0.10067 (-2.33) -0.0333 (-0.82) 
Subprime density     
  no lag 0.03257 (1.16) 0.07877 (2.41) 0.0424 (1.94) 0.05003 (2.18) 
  3 month lag -0.02595 (-1.35) 0.01102 (0.54) -0.00912 (-0.42) -0.0087 (-0.33) 
  6 month lag -0.02414 (-0.94) -0.03075 (-1.05) -0.03156 (-1) -0.06154 (-1.91) 
  9 month lag -0.00848 (-0.41) -0.00398 (-0.13) -0.00328 (-0.15) 0.02928 (1.01) 
  12 month lag 0.02492 (0.85) 0.02836 (0.81) 0.05037 (1.6) 0.04368 (1.25) 
Non-owner occ. density     
  no lag 0.22412 (7.29) 0.27425 (10.17) 0.27147 (8.03) 0.265 (8.78) 
  3 month lag 0.32986 (3.86) 0.30902 (4.99) 0.32563 (3.39) 0.33522 (3.28) 
  6 month lag 0.08758 (1.93) 0.09312 (4.35) 0.09395 (1.2) 0.09323 (1.7) 
  9 month lag -0.21922 (-2.16) -0.22218 (-2.13) -0.25375 (-2.15) -0.24727 (-2.17) 
  12 month lag -0.26499 (-4.67) -0.27441 (-5.78) -0.25606 (-4.01) -0.30764 (-5.22) 
Combined LTV (CLTV) -0.00225 (-0.04) -0.16021 (-2.8)     0.00061 (0.01) 0.00048 (0.01) 
Aggregate Home Mtgs ($trill) -1.98233 (-2.81) -0.79054 (-1.04) -1.89208 (-2.09) -2.5936 (-3.64) 
Real GDP ($bill) 0.00232 (1.67) -0.00058 (-0.28) 0.00268 (1.22) 0.00377 (2.23) 
Aggregate personal savings ($bill) 0.00008 (0.13) -0.0005 (-0.46) 0.00002 (0.02) 0.00071 (0.89) 
S&P 500 Index -0.00156 (-1.83) -0.00113 (-0.83) -0.00224 (-1.79) -0.00122 (-1.05) 
US govt 10yr/2yr YTM -0.28235 (-0.77) -0.42171 (-1.03) -0.46114 (-0.88) -0.14534 (-0.29) 
Population (in 100,000's) 0.01335 (3.24) 0.00613 (1.52) 0.013 (2.89) 0.0095 (2.79) 
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.40178 (-3.05) -0.2794 (-1.97) -0.27189 (-1.77) -0.37617 (-2.61) 
Income ($1000) 0.01795 (0.3) 0.06506 (0.97) 0.05755 (0.97) 0.04103 (0.9) 
Average Mortgage Rate (%) -0.085 (-0.25) -0.16391 (-0.44) -0.09089 (-0.2) -0.22272 (-0.47) 
Urban CPI (1984=100) 0.11381 (1.2) 0.03884 (0.46) 0.0499 (0.52) 0.10899 (1.02) 
WRLURI 0.57372 (2.2) 0.19881 (0.51) 0.3834 (1.3) 0.47531 (2.19) 
Intercept -27.99091 (-1.59) 18.95099 (0.97) -22.02453 (-0.95) -38.94446 (-2.3) 
Rho 0.6695297 0.6159624 0.6696074 0.5596928 











Subprime Intensity 1998Q1-2006Q4 
  
Housing returns  
  no lag 0.1599 (2.61) 
  3 month lag 0.02415 (0.25) 
  6 month lag 0.22269 (3.04) 
  9 month lag 0.28475 (3.61) 
  12 month lag 0.34383 (3.68) 
CLTV 0.61817 (6.69) 
Aggregate Home Mortgages (Trill) 16.53315 (13.67) 
Real GDP ($bill) 0.01802 (10.1) 
Aggregate personal savings ($bill) 0.00309 (3.74) 
S&P 500 Index -0.00944 (-10.26) 
US govt 10yr/2yr YTM -3.08939 (-11.11) 
Population (in 100,000's) 0.00025 (0) 
Unemployment Rate (%) 0.40545 (1.58) 
Income ($1000) -1.38444 (-3.43) 
Average Mortgage Rate (%) -1.56867 (-4.64) 
Urban CPI (1984=100) 1.09384 (11.7) 
WRLURI 0.61689 (0.14) 










Total and GSE vs. Private-Issue MBS Share of Net Home Mortgage Flows 




Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts. Percent of Quarterly Flow can be negative or 
greater than 100% because institutions may sell or buy home mortgages from each other in addition to 




Housing Price Return Model Before and After GSEs’ Decline in Share of Originations 
 
         Model 2a  Model 2b 
        Regime I  Regime II 
N 337 228 
Adjusted Rsqr 0.5333 0.6178 
Case-Shiller HPI returns 1998Q1-2003Q3 2003Q4-2006Q4 
   
Jumbo Prime   
  no lag -0.04773 (-0.92) 0.00851 (0.24) 
  3 month lag -0.3041 (-9.77) 0.02819 (0.62) 
  6 month lag -0.11742 (-2.27) -0.05424 (-0.55) 
  9 month lag 0.00833 (0.27) 0.04439 (0.68) 
  12 month lag 0.32714 (10.74) -0.08766 (-1.27) 
Alt-A density   
  no lag -0.03894 (-0.29) 0.23538 (4.26) 
  3 month lag 0.32 (2.58) -0.02826 (-0.51) 
  6 month lag -0.26848 (-0.87) -0.08275 (-2.05) 
  9 month lag 0.23187 (1.51) -0.02114 (-0.4) 
  12 month lag 0.2209 (2.1) -0.0639 (-1.47) 
Subprime density   
  no lag 0.17434 (2.01) -0.01391 (-0.47) 
  3 month lag -0.05126 (-0.58) -0.0587 (-1.47) 
  6 month lag -0.17546 (-1.84) 0.00315 (0.1) 
  9 month lag 0.13687 (1.83) 0.00381 (0.11) 
  12 month lag -0.01264 (-0.16) 0.03545 (1.08) 
Non-owner occ. density   
  no lag -0.0015 (-0.02) 0.35189 (5.84) 
  3 month lag 0.3117 (3.06) 0.15998 (1.21) 
  6 month lag 0.0272 (0.33) 0.15443 (2.06) 
  9 month lag 0.06846 (0.42) -0.26134 (-1.48) 
  12 month lag -0.30898 (-2.22) -0.29717 (-3.32) 
Combined LTV (CLTV) -0.03886 (-1.06) -0.19618 (-2.02) 
Aggregate Home Mortgages (Trill) 0.31955 (0.2) 2.55352 (1.68) 
Real GDP ($bill) -0.00107 (-0.88) -0.01742 (-2.47) 
Aggregate personal savings ($bill) -0.00137 (-0.88) -0.00166 (-0.57) 
S&P 500 Index -0.00124 (-0.85) -0.00209 (-0.2) 
US govt 10yr/2yr YTM -2.19021 (-1.45) -3.98686 (-5.6) 
Population (in 100,000's) 0.00624 (1.28) 0.00415 (0.69) 
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.44089 (-3.08) -0.23415 (-1.12) 
Income ($1000) 0.13645 (2.43) -0.02624 (-0.31) 
Average Mortgage Rate (%) 0.34659 (1.47) -0.28825 (-0.11) 
Urban CPI (1984=100) 0.18763 (1.93) 0.22497 (0.75) 
WRLURI 0.14084 (0.67) 0.71278 (1.42) 
Intercept -21.38322 (-1.59) 153.4307 (1.74) 
rho 0.5312735 0.7264739 
Durbin-Watson 1.765077 1.603208 
 
